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RCRA and the Responsible Corporate.
Officer Doctrine: Getting Tough on
Corporate Offenders by Sidestepping
the Mens Rea Requirement
INTRODUCTION
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)1 was
passed by Congress in 1976 as part of the growing national effort
to control the dangers of environmental pollution.2 Section 6928(d)
of RCRA provides that certain criminal acts committed knowingly
shall be punished as felony offenses. 3 Confusion over how to apply
the knowledge requirement under this section of the Act' has cen-
tered around the application of the responsible corporate officer
(RCO) doctrine5 that has been developed by the Supreme Court in
the context of strict liability crimes.
6
1 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West Supp. 1991).
2 See Robert A. Milne, The Mens Rea Requirement of the Federal Environmental
Statutes: Strict Criminal Liability in Substance But Not Form, 37 BuFF. L. Rnv. 307, 316
(1988-89).
3 The section provides in part as follows:
(d) Criminal penalties
Any person who -
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste
identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a
permit under this subchapter...
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or
listed under this subchapter-
(A) without a permit under this subchapter...
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such
permit; or
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any
applicable interim status regulations or standards; ... shall, upon conviction,
be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of violation, or
imprisonment not to exceed two years ... , or both.
42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(1), (2)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 1991).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Laughlin, 768 F. Supp. 957, 960 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting
confusion over congressional intent of "knowingly").
I See generally Alan Zarky, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 5 Toxics L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 983 (Jan. 9, 1991) (discussing the doctrine as a hybrid of corporate
and criminal law).
6 See infra part I.A.
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In the past decade, two federal courts of appeals have looked
favorably upon the use of variants of the RCO doctrine to obtain
criminal convictions under § 6928(d) of RCRA.7 By contrast, in the
recent case United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,8
the First Circuit overturned a jury trial conviction that had relied
on certain aspects of the RCO doctrine.9 The court rejected the use
of the RCO doctrine because, in the court's view, it effectively
short-circuits the RCRA's knowledge requirement.'0
This Note addresses the resulting conflict among the circuits.
Part I traces the development of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine in Supreme Court decisions concerning public welfare sta-
tutes. Part II deals with the history of the knowledge requirement
under § 6928(d) of RCRA, as interpreted by various federal courts
of appeals. Finally, Part III discusses MacDonald & Watson in light
of this background.
This Note concludes that application of the RCO doctrine is
inappropriate in a case that requires proof of actual knowledge as
part of the statutory definition of the crime. This is so even when
Congress intended the statute being construed to aid in protecting
the public welfare. Concerns over due process place strict criminal
liability on shaky constitutional footing; as such, the scope of such
liability should not be extended arbitrarily by the courts without a
clear expression of congressional intent to do so. The use of the
RCO doctrine allows the government to side-step a mens rea re-
quirement by establishing a defendant's knowledge as to any element
of a crime, without proving actual knowledge. Because of this
possibility, the doctrine should not be used as a means of obtaining
a conviction under § 6928(d) of RCRA, which includes knowledge
as an element of all the crimes it defines."
I. THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFCER DOcTRNE
A. Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court developed the RCO doctrine in the context
of strict criminal liability, i.e., in relation to crimes that have no
7 See United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S.
, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 670
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
1 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
9 See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 50-55 (Ist
Cir. 1991).
1O See id. at 51-52.
" See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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mens rea requirement. Such crimes are usually found in regulatory
statutes and are often termed public welfare offenses. 12 The RCO
doctrine has its roots in United States v. Balint,"3 in which the Court
stated: "mhe State may in the maintenance of a public policy
provide 'that he who shall do [particular prohibited acts] shall do
them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good
faith or ignorance. '1"1 4 Balint was concerned chiefly with the consti-
tutionality of imposing a felony conviction on the basis of strict
liability. 5 The Court held that this practice was not a violation of
due process, in large part because the importance of protecting the
public health and safety outweighed the "possible injustice of sub-
jecting an innocent seller [of narcotics] to a penalty.'
6
United States v. Dotterweich17 was the first Supreme Court case
to deal directly with the question of strict liability for criminal
defendants charged on the basis of their position within a corporate
structure. The Court established important principles in Dotterweich.
First, legislation that promoted public welfare could "dispense1 with
the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of
some wrongdoing." 8 Second, congressional intent was to be a cen-
tral consideration when a court balanced the goal of protecting the
individual from unjust prosecution against that of protecting the
public from undue risks to health and safety.19 Third, not only could
the actor that created the public welfare risk be liable for resulting
harm, but anyone "otherwise innocent but standing in a responsible
relation to a public danger" t' could be held liable as well. In the
current context, this "responsible relation" applies to those whose
supervisory duties include control over activities that present a risk
of hazard to the community at large. Such activities include the
12 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952); Karen M. Hansen, "'Know-
ing" Environmental Crimes, 16 Wm. Mrrcanm. L. Ray. 987, 998 (1990).
13 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (involving an indictment for a violation of the Narcotic Act of
1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785, in which the defendant argued that the government
had the burden of proving that he knew that the substances sold were illegal drugs).
1, United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v.
Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 70 (1910)).
" See Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution:
Substantive Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1571, 1592-93 (1978).
6 Balint, 258 U.S. at 254.
17 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
"1 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
'9 See id. at 285 ("Balancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon
those who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions
imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to
throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless.").
Id. at 281 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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distribution for sale of foods and drugs that might be adulterated,
and the disposal of hazardous wastes.
21
Morissette v. United States" further elaborated on the doctrine
of strict criminal liability. Although Justice Jackson's opinion con-
veyed concern with the notion of strict liability in criminal prose-
cutions,21 Jackson explained that it is appropriate in the context of
public welfare offenses:
[L]egislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy,
does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he
does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it
with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no
more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who as-
sumed his responsibilities.'
Jackson also indicated that an important consideration for the Court,
besides the public policy established by the legislature, was the size
and stigma of the penalty,2 noting that strict criminal liability was
appropriate only when "penalties commonly are relatively small,
and conviction does no grave damage to an offender's reputation."
' '
Finally, Jackson remarked that many public welfare offenses "are
in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction
where it imposes a duty," 27 thus indicating that a failure to act can
be just as culpable as a prohibited action.
In Morissette, the Court concentrated on the fact that Congress
had codified a common law crime.2 Later, in two cases heard during
the October, 1970 Term, the Court addressed the question of how
21 United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1971).
2 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The statute that Morissette allegedly violated provided that
"[w]hoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts" property of the United States
shall be subject to fine and imprisonment. See id. at 248 n.2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 641 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988)).
3 See id. at 250 ("The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.").
24 Id. at 256.
3 Morissette was convicted of a misdemeanor offense and sentenced to two months
imprisonment or a $200 fine. See id. at 248.
26 Id.
" Id. at 255.
2" See id. at 262-63. Courts cannot do away with the traditional mens rea requirement
for a codified common law crime unless Congress clearly so intends. When an "offense is
new to general law," however, an apparent failure to include criminal intent as a requirement
for conviction can be construed to intend the creation of a strict liability crime. Id. at 262.
The Court refused to allow a conviction without proof of Morissette's intention as to the acts
alleged: "He must have had knowledge of the facts, though not necessarily the law, that made
the taking a conversion." Id. at 271.
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to apply a knowledge requirement to a public welfare offense. In
United States v. Freed,29 the alleged crime involved possession of
unregistered firearms, and the relevant statute contained no mens
rea requirement.30 The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice
Douglas, stated that a "regulatory measure in the interest of the
public safety ... may well be premised on the theory that one
would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades
is not an innocent act.
' 3'
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, divided the crime
into its three elements: (1) possession of items that (2) are hand
grenades and (3) are unregistered. He posited that the legislative
history made clear Congress's intention to require proof of defen-
dant's mens rea as to the first two elements of the crime.
3 2
As to the third element, Brennan made an important distinction
between ignorance of the law, which is no excuse, and ignorance of
a legal element of the crime, which may be a valid ignorance of
fact defense. Given a mens rea requirement as to whether the
grenades are registered, the defendant could not claim ignorance of
the registration requirement, as such a claim would be an untenable
ignorance of the law defense. A claim that he mistakenly believed
that the weapons were registered, however, would be a claim of
ignorance of "circumstances that the law has defined as material to
the offense. ' 3 3 These circumstances would be a set of facts that
contain a legal element, and as such would be a basis for an
ignorance of fact defense. This defense would not be disallowed per
se.
34
Brennan concluded by stating that Congress did not in fact
require proof of mens rea as to whether the grenades were unregis-
tered: "Without exception, the likelihood of governmental regulation
of the distribution of such weapons is so great that anyone must be
- 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
30 See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (applying 26 U.S.C. § 5812(a)
(Supp. V. 1964) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 5812(a) (1988))).
3' Id. at 609.
See id. at 612, 614 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan pointed to the mens rea
requirement under the case law interpreting the provisions replaced by the amendments that
were construed in the case. Because Congress was aware of this case law at the time the
amendments were passed, "we may therefore properly infer that Congress meant that the
Government must prove knowledge with regard to the first two elements of the offense under
the amended statute." Id. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" Id. at 615 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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presumed to be aware of it."" 5 Brennan agreed with the Court that
the statute was meant to impose strict criminal liability on violators,
at least as to the third element of the offense.
3 6
Apparently, when strict liability is intended by Congress, a court
will allow a presumption that a defendant knew what the average
person would be expected to know. This presumption, that the
average person realizes that the possession and use of dangerous
materials is likely to be regulated by law, enables a court to avoid
the due process problem first raised in Balint.3 7
In United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.,3
the Court construed a statute providing that whoever "knowingly
violates any . . . regulation" regarding the shipment of dangerous
acids, as formulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
pursuant to the statute, "shall be fined or imprisoned. ' 39 The Court
likened this case to Freed in that neither of the statutes involved in
the cases imposed strict liability; both required knowledge by a
defendant of the shipment of dangerous materiaIs. 40 Here, the Court
misconstrued its own prior analysis, for Freed had in fact imposed
strict liability as to at least the third element of the alleged offense. 4'
In analyzing the statute, the Court relied on legislative history
to determine that Congress had not intended to create strict criminal
liability.42 As a result, the knowledge requirement applied to each
element of the offense, although the government did not have to
prove that the defendant had knowledge of the regulation.43 Only
ignorance as to the legal aspects of a material fact or circumstance
would be a valid defense. Therefore, "[a] person thinking in good
faith that he was shipping distilled water when in fact he was
shipping some dangerous acid would not be covered" 44 by the stat-
ute. Justice Douglas concluded the Court's opinion by stating:
11 Id. at 616 (Brennan, J., concurring).
36 See id. at 616 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 609 (explaining the court's rationale
for imposing strict liability as to the third element of the offense) (citing Balint, 258 U.S. at
254).
See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
- 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
3 See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 559 (1971)
(applying 18 U.S.C. § 834(f) (repealed 1979)).
40 See id. at 560.
4' See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
42 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563. "There is leeway for the exercise of
congressional discretion in applying the reach of 'mens rea."' Id. at 564 (citations omitted).
41 See id. at 563.
" Id. at 563-64.
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Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may also be regulated. But they
may be the type of products which might raise substantial due
process questions if Congress did not require ... "mens rea" as
to each ingredient of the offense. But where, as here and as in
Balint and Freed, dangerous or deleterious devices or products or
obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regula-
tion is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession
of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of
the regulation.4
In United States v. Park,4 the Court returned to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), a strict liability statute under
which it had first begun to develop the responsible corporate officer
doctrine.47 The court of appeals had properly followed the Dotter-
welch opinion in ruling that the FDCA did not require proof of
"awareness of wrongdoing."'' It had held also that Park could be
found guilty only if the government proved a "wrongful action" on
his part.49
The Supreme Court began its opinion by discussing the familiar
agency theory of vicarious liability. Under this theory, the criminal
act of a subordinate could create liability for his or her superiors
"who by virtue of their managerial positions or other similar relation
to the actor could be deemed responsible for [the act's] commis-
sion .... [Wihere the statute ... dispense[s] with 'consciousness of
wrongdoing,' an omission or failure to act [is] a sufficient basis for
a responsible corporate agent's liability," even without knowledge
on the part of the agent.so In the context of this type of strict
liability statute, responsible corporate agents are held to the "re-
quirements of foresight and vigilance" in areas in which they are
vested with responsibility and power."
The Court in Park retreated slightly from the severity of the
strict liability standard applied in Dotterweich. First, Chief Justice
41 Id. at 564-65 (emphasis added).
421 U.S. 658 (1974).
See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
4 "United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 666 (1974).
" See id. Park, the chief executive officer of a national retail food chain that had
allegedly violated the FDCA, was convicted based both on his general oversight duties for all
aspects of the company business and on specific information he had received from the FDA
regarding the need to correct conditions at one of the corporation's warehouses. See id. at
660-63.
10 Id. at 670-71.
SI Id. at 672 ("Mhe Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy
violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will
insure that violations will not occur.").
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Burger spoke of "some measure of blameworthiness" arising from
the "responsible relationship" between the corporate officer and the
violation.5 2 Indeed, Burger made clear that the responsible corporate
officer was not to be found guilty "solely on the basis of [his]
position in the corporation." 53 Second, the defendant officer could
present a defense to the charge based on a claim that he was
"powerless" to prevent or correct the relevant violation.5 Thus,
even in a case of strict criminal liability, the defendant is afforded
possible relief from liability based solely on his "responsible" cor-
porate position.
The final Supreme Court case to address the general issue of
the mens rea requirement for public welfare offenses is Liparota v.
United States.55 In Liparota, the defendant was alleged to have
committed food stamp fraud by violating a statute that punished
"whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses
coupons ... in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the
regulations." 56 The issue was whether the government had to prove
that the defendant knew his actions were illegal. The Court held
that the unauthorized nature of the defendant's conduct was a
material fact, and a legal element of the crime, so that defendant's
claim of ignorance of the regulations was an acceptable ignorance
of fact defenseY7 The government was left with the task of proving
that the defendant knew his acts were unauthorized, "as in any
other criminal prosecution requiring mens rea, . . by reference to
facts and circumstances surrounding the case.''58
Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion of the Court, classified
public welfare offenses into two categories: (1) where the offenses
"depend on no mental element but consist only of forbidden acts
or omissions," 59 and (2) where "Congress has rendered criminal a
type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to
stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the commun-
ity's health or safety." 6 He concluded that the presence of the
32 See id. at 673.
53 Id. at 674.
54 See id. at 673.
- 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
16 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 420 (1985) (quoting 78 Stat. 708, codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1988)).
See id. at 425 n.9.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 432 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252-53).
6 Id. at 433.
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knowledge requirement in the statute, coupled with the innocuous
nature of food stamp coupons, prevented this case from fitting into
either category.,
B. Analysis
Important conclusions can be drawn from the preceding account.
First, congressional intent is a central consideration in determining
the scope of the RCO doctrine. Any attempt to extend that doctrine
to include types of public welfare offenses that do not involve strict
liability should be based on the clearly expressed intent of Congress.
Second, application of the RCO doctrine does not mean that a
corporate officer charged with a crime is defenseless, despite having
been charged without having had a "consciousness of wrongdoing."
Third, those engaged in the handling of "obnoxious waste materi-
als" can be presumed to be aware of the existence of regulations
concerning those materials. The Supreme Court has generally re-
frained, however, from extending this presumption of knowledge to
cover actual violations of these regulations. It is only with respect
to strict liability crimes that the Court has been willing to dispense
with the "consciousness of wrongdoing" for corporate officers.
With respect to mens rea requirements, the Court has allowed a
presumption as to knowledge of regulation, but this does not mean
that a court can presume that a responsible corporate officer had
knowledge of an actual violation.
Finally, because the responsible corporate officer doctrine has
been developed in the context of strict criminal liability, it is inap-
propriate to apply it to criminal statutes that have a mens rea
requirement. More traditional doctrines of liability, such as the
vicarious liability aspects of agency theory or the doctrine of willful
blindness,6 can serve the function of convicting corporate officers
and should be preferred to the RCO doctrine in the context of
statutory provisions with mens rea requirements. The use of the
RCO doctrine in such contexts makes it too easy for juries and
courts to overlook the need to prove that the defendant had actual
knowledge as to every element of the alleged crime.
61 See id.
6 See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
1991-921 1063
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
II. THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
A. Overview
The first task that a court faces when dealing with a criminal
statute that contains a knowledge requirement is to determine the
parameters to use in applying that requirement to each element of
the offense. Section 6928(d) of the RCRA61 uses the term "know-
ingly," which is defined by the Model Penal Code in the following
terms:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct
or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is-of
that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element
involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.6
In order to "know" certain facts one must be "actually aware of
them."65
Certain qualifying doctrines regarding the knowledge require-
ment have developed, the most important for the purposes of this
Note being "willful blindness."6 The basic tenet of this doctrine is
that a crime's knowledge requirement is satisfied if the defendant
was aware at the time of the alleged crime that there was a "high
probability" that his actions were illegal and then failed to investi-
gate the situation, as a means of shielding himself from knowledge
of the truth. Some courts may require additionally that the defen-
dant's motive for remaining ignorant was to avoid future liability.
67
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1962).
65 Id.; see also Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge
Requirement of Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 GEo. WASH. L.
Rnv. 862, 873 (1991) ("An act is done 'knowingly' if it is 'done voluntarily and intentionally
and not because of ignorance, mistake, accident, or other innocent reason."' (citations
omitted)).
66See Hansen, supra note 12, at 990.
61 See id. at 991-93. In United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096
(9th Cir. 1985), the court held: "Mhe government must present evidence indicating that [the]
defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in
the event of subsequent prosecution. Absent such evidence, the jury might impermissibly infer
guilty knowledge on the basis of mere negligence without proof of deliberate avoidance." Id.
at 1098.
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In United States v. Jewell,6 the defendant was convicted on the
basis of a willful blindness instruction. Justice (then Judge) Kennedy
criticized the majority for allowing the instruction to be used to
lower the mens rea requirement-from a requirement of knowledge
to one of recklessness or negligence in failing to investigate a sus-
picion regarding the facts.69 As one commentator has put it, "'[Tlhere
is no conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth when the risk
of unlawfulness has not been realized."' 70 Further, Kennedy argued
that "[w]hen a statute specifically requires knowledge as an element
of a crime ... the substitution of some other state of mind cannot
be justified even if the court deems that both are equally blame-
worthy."
71
B. The Knowledge Requirement in Previous Courts of Appeals
Cases
A problem that is encountered frequently when dealing with
statutes that contain a knowledge requirement is determining the
elements to which the knowledge requirement applies. Section 6928(d)
contains five elements that could contain a knowledge requirement:
(1) knowledge of the act of disposing of materials, (2) knowledge
of the fact that RCRA regulates the disposal of dangerous waste
materials, (3) knowledge of the permit requirement for a waste
disposal site, (4) knowledge of the permit status of the facility to
which hazardous wastes are transported, and (5) knowledge that the
disposed material is in fact hazardous within the terms of RCRA. 72
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.73 presented the first op-
portunity for the courts of appeals to consider this issue. The
532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
6 See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 707 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951
(1976) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Here, defendant drove someone else's car across the border
into the United States. Marijuana was enclosed in a secret compartment within the car.
Defendant claimed no knowledge of what was in the compartment, although he admitted
knowing of its existence. The jury found, pursuant to a willful blindness instruction, that
defendant had the required mens rea because defendant failed to inquire into the contents of
the compartment.
70 Hansen, supra note 12, at 992 (quoting Rollin M. Perkins, "Knowledge" as a Mens
Rea Requirement, 29 HAsTiNGS L.J. 953, 964 (1978)).
1, Jewell, 532 F.2d at 706 (footnote omitted).
7 See Barrett & Clarke, supra note 65 (setting forth the elements for which knowledge
may be required); see also Rebecca S. Webber, Elements Analysis Applied to Environmental
Crimes: What Did They Know and When Did They Know It?, 16 B.C. EwvmL. AFF. L. REv.
53, 84 (1988) (listing the elements to be considered).
741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
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individual defendants in the case, managers of a motor vehicle repair
facility, were charged with criminal liability for violations under §
6928(d) of RCRA. The violations occurred when workers at the
facility pumped waste chemicals from cleaning operations into a
trench that eventually led into the Delaware River.74
The Third Circuit discussed the problem created by the ambig-
uous use of the word "knowingly" in § 6928(d)(2). 75 The problem
is to determine "how far down the sentence the word 'knowingly'
is intended to travel."' 76 First, the Third Circuit noted that because
RCRA is a regulatory or "public welfare" statute, "there would be
a reasonable basis for reading the statute without any mens rea
requirement." 77 The use of the word "knowing" in subsection (B)
of 6928(d)(2), 78 however, gave the court pause. This language implied
that the government had a more difficult task in convicting one that
had violated a material permit condition at a permitted site (under
subsection (B)) than in convicting one that had used a site that had
no permit at all (under subsection (A)). Finding this to be counter-
intuitive, the Third Circuit concluded that the knowledge require-
ment must apply to every element of the offense outlined in §
6928(d)(2).
The court then stated that the government's task of proving
knowledge would not be particularly onerous, however, because the
defendant would be presumed to know that his actions are subject
to regulation when he is dealing with dangerous waste materials.
The court cited United States v. International Minerals & Chemical
Corp.80 for the proposition that "under certain regulatory statutes
requiring 'knowing' conduct the government need prove only knowl-
edge of the actions taken and not of the statute forbidding them."'"
Next, however, the court attempted to make the governmental
task of proof even easier by referring to the "absolute liability"
1, See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 663-64 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
71 See id. at 667-68.
76 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (citing WAYNE LAPAvE & Ausmn
W. ScoTT, CaumNAL LAW § 27 (1972)).
7 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668 (citing United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280,
288 (1922); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-54 (1922)). The Court stated: "[Ciriminal
penalties attached to regulatory statutes intended to protect public health, in contrast to
statutes based on common law crimes, are to be construed to effectuate the regulatory
purpose." Id. at 666.
'8 For the relevant text of this subsection, see supra note 3.
See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668-69.
402 U.S. 558 (1971).
S, Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669.
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threatening officers, agents, and employees of a corporation when
they deal with "obnoxious waste materials."' 2 The court's authority
for this proposition derived from United States v. Dotterweich83 and
United States v. Balint. 4 Both of these latter cases, however, con-
strued statutes that involved strict criminal liability.85 Such liability
dispenses with the conventional requirement for "consciousness of
wrongdoing" on the part of the defendant. s6 The Third Circuit held
that the "knowledge" requirement under RCRA could be satisfied
by inference from the individual defendants' "requisite responsible
positions" within the corporation, s7 apparently because as managers
they should have known of the violations.
A later case, United States v. Dee,88 approved of a much more
direct application of the RCO doctrine. In Dee, the three individual
defendants were responsible for RCRA compliance at the United
States Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground. Dee was informed of
improper disposal of lab wastes in violation of RCRA regulations
as early as 1984. Violations continued through 1986, despite warn-
ings on more than one occasion that cleanup was needed. Dee
testified that he did not feel that the chemicals were a serious
problem. He argued that the government had failed to prove that
he had the requisite "intent" to violate RCRA.89
The Fourth Circuit ruled directly on two arguments made by
the individual defendants: (1) that the government had not proven
"that they knew that violation of RCRA was a crime," and (2) that
they had been "unaware that the chemicals they managed were
hazardous wastes" in terms of the RCRA regulations. 90 The court
correctly and easily dispensed with these arguments. First, in the
light of International Minerals and other Supreme Court precedents,
"ignorance of the law is no defense," especially when defendants
were dealing with "obnoxious waste materials" for which the knowl-
edge of regulation is to be presumed.9' Second, the knowledge
requirement in § 6928(d)(2)-that defendants knowingly disposed of
Id. (citing International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 569).
320 U.S. 277 (1943).
4 258 U.S. 250.
15 See supra part I.A.
See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 670.
" 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
- See Barrett & Clarke, supra note 65, at 866-70.
90 See United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S.
, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
91 See id.
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"any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter"-
is met as long as defendants were aware of the dangerous or "ob-
noxious" nature of the waste materials involved.9 Although the
Fourth Circuit disapproved of the jury instruction used at the trial
level, which had failed to indicate that defendants at least had to
know that the waste materials involved were dangerous or "hazard-
ous," 93 the court held this instruction to be harmless error.
94
Having properly disposed of these issues, the court then erred
by allowing the RCO doctrine to taint the jury instructions. In a
footnote, the court stated that "[a]s a whole, the instructions 'fairly
and adequately state[d] the pertinent legal principles involved."' 95
Although the RCO doctrine was never mentioned explicitly in the
Fourth Circuit's opinion, the jury instructions that it approved
reflected an express adaptation of that doctrine to the facts presented
at trial.9 This Note disagrees with the use of the RCO doctrine in
this context, for it allows a conviction based upon defendant's
"knowing" failure to detect a violation. This seems a contradiction
in terms, for failure to detect is at best negligence-unless it results
from willful blindness, in which case an instruction to the jury
concerning the willful blindness doctrine would be appropriate. In-
nocently failing to detect a violation, or even doing so negligently
92 See id.; supra note 45 and accompanying text.
11 See Dee, 912 F.2d at 745; see also Barrett & Clarke, supra note 65, at 880-81
(discussing the knowledge requirement as analyzed by the Fourth Circuit).
- See Dee, 912 F.2d at 745.
91 Id. at 746 n.8 (quoting Hogg's Oyster Co. v. United States, 676 F.2d 1015, 1019 (4th
Cir. 1982)).
9See Barrett & Clarke, supra note 65, at 885. The court instructed the jury as follows:
Among the circumstances you may consider in determining the defendant's
knowledge are their positions in the organization, including their responsibilities
under the regulations and under any applicable policies. Thus you may, but
need not, infer that a defendant knew facts which you find that they should
have known given their positions in the organization, their relationship to other
employees, or any applicable policies or regulation.
... [A]s managers within the munitions directorate, defendants may be
found guilty of counts one, two, three, or four if you find that the government
has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that each defendant has a responsible relation to the violation. That
is, that it occurred under his area of authority and supervisory responsibility.
That each defendant had the power or the capacity to prevent the violation.
That each defendant acted knowingly in failing to prevent, detect, or correct the
violation.
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix to Appellee's Brief at 1154-55, United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d
741 (4th Cir. 1990) (No. 90-877), cert. denied, - U.S. -, II1 S. Ct. 1307 (1991)).
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or recklessly, is not a knowing violation for the purposes of the
RCRA statute 7
III. UNTED STATES V. MACDONALD & WATSON WASTE OiL Co.
The most recent court of appeals case to address the RCO
doctrine in light of an RCRA violation is United States v. Mac-
Donald & Watson Waste Oil Co.98 MacDonald & Watson (Mac-
Donald) operated a waste disposal facility under the Rhode Island
RCRA permit of Narragansett Improvement Co. (NIC) at the Poe
Street Lot leased from NIC. The permit authorized disposal of liquid
hazardous wastes only. Neither MacDonald nor NIC had an RCRA
permit for solid wastes. D'Allesandro, president of MacDonald,
admitted that he was the manager of the waste operations at the
Poe Street Lot. Master Chemical Company contracted with Mac-
Donald to dispose of certain hazardous wastes, including toluene-
contaminated soil. Shipments of the soil were made to the Poe Street
lot under the supervision of two employees of MacDonald. The
corporation, its president, and the two supervising employees were
all charged9 with criminal violations of § 6928(d) of RCRA.' °
The First Circuit overturned the conviction of President D'AI-
lesandro because
the district court erred by instructing the jury that proof that a
defendant was a responsible corporate officer, as described, would
suffice to conclusively establish the element of knowledge expressly
required under § 3008(d)(1).... In a crime having knowledge as
an express element, a mere showing of official responsibility under
Dotterweich and Park is not an adequate substitute for direct or
circumstantial proof of knowledge.'
0'
The faulty jury instruction made explicit the possibility that the jury
could find the RCRA knowledge requirement to be satisfied either
through the traditional showing of actual knowledge, based upon
either direct or circumstantial evidence, or alternatively through the
use of the RCO doctrine.'2
See generally Zarky, supra note 5, at 983.
933 F.2d 35 (Ist Cir. 1991).
See MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 39-40.
® 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
202 McDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 55.
12 See id. at 50. The district court had instructed the jury as follows:
When an individual Defendant is also a corporate officer, the Government may
10691991-92]
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The First Circuit based its reasoning on the complete lack of
"precedent for failing to give effect to a knowledge requirement
that Congress has expressly included in a criminal statute."' 3 The
court rejected United States v. Dotterweich and United States v.
Park as inapplicable precedents because the RCO doctrine estab-
lished in those cases was meant "for strict liability misdemeanors,"'10
not for felonies requiring proof of knowledge.0 5 The court approved
of the jury instructions regarding the knowledge requirement gen-
erally and the willful blindness doctrine specifically.c 6 The First
Circuit clearly did not mean to deny the government the ability to
prove knowledge indirectly, based on circumstantial evidence.0 7
Evidence was presented at trial to the effect that D'Allesandro,
the corporate officer charged in the case, had been told of previous
prove that individual's knowledge in either of two ways. The first way is to
demonstrate that the Defendant had actual knowledge of the act in question.
The second way is to establish that the defendant was what is called a responsible
officer of the corporation committing the act. In order to prove that a person
is a responsible corporate officer three things must be shown. First, it must be
shown that the person is an officer of the corporation, not merely an employee.
Second, it must be shown that the officer had direct responsibility for the
activities that are alleged to be illegal. Simply being an officer or even the
president of a corporation is not enough. The Government must prove that the
person had a responsibility to supervise the activities in question. And the third
requirement is that the officer must have known or believed that the illegal
activity of the type alleged occurred.
Id.
103 Id. at 52.
104 Id.
' See id.
10 The acceptable jury instruction read as follows:
An act is said to be done knowingly if it is done voluntarily and intentionally
and not because of ignorance, mistake, accident or some other reason. The
requirement that an act be done knowingly is designed to insure that a Defendant
will not be convicted for an act that he did not intend to commit or the nature
of which he did not understand. Proof that a Defendant acted knowingly or
with knowledge of a particular fact does not require direct evidence of what
was in that Defendant's mind. Whether a Defendant acted knowingly or with
knowledge of a particular fact may be inferred from that Defendant's conduct,
from that Defendant's familiarity with the subject matter in question or from
all of the other facts and circumstances connected with the case. In determining
whether a Defendant acted knowingly, you also may consider whether the
Defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been
obvious. If so, the element of knowledge may be satisfied because a Defendant
cannot avoid responsibility by purposefully avoiding learning the truth. However,
mere negligence or mistake in not learning the facts is not sufficient to satisfy
the element of knowledge.
Id. at 52 n.15.
,01 See id. at 52.
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violations at the Poe Street Lot. 108 Had the jury found that D'A1-
lesandro ignored these reports in an attempt to remain ignorant of
the truth and thus to avoid liability as to the alleged violations for
which he was charged, D'Allesandro may have been ensnared on
the basis of the properly given willful blindness instruction. The
government's use of the RCO doctrine and the district court's inclu-
sion of it in the jury instructions, however, opened up the possibility
that D'Allesandro could be convicted even if he had taken every
reasonable precaution to prevent a recurrence of the supposed prior
violations and had been given no reasonable basis for suspicion that
the violations alleged by the government were in fact occurring.
Perhaps a conviction based on circumstantial evidence or willful
blindness could have been obtained without the use of the RCO
instructions. The government was not satisfied with this approach,
however, and received its requested instruction concerning the RCO
doctrine as an alternative way of establishing actual knowledge on
the part of the defendant. The First Circuit balked at this attempt
to prove actual knowledge, not on the basis of circumstantial or
indirect evidence, but rather merely on the basis of a presumption
stemming from the defendant's corporate position.1' 9
The First Circuit characterized the suspect jury instructions as
creating a "mandatory" presumption that defendant knew of the
facts constituting the offense, based solely on his position as a
responsible corporate officer. 10 Although this characterization over-
states the severity of the effect of the RCO jury instructions, the
general thrust of the court's view is accurate. If actual knowledge
of illegal shipments is required under RCRA, and if such knowledge
can be established via indirect or circumstantial evidence based on
the willful blindness doctrine, there seems little need to muddy the
waters with attempts to apply the RCO doctrine.
The difficulty with instructions that incorporate the RCO doc-
trine is that they leave the jury with little guidance as to how to
define the term "responsibility." As Justice Stewart stated in his
Park dissent: "'Responsibility' as used by the trial judge therefore
had whatever meaning the jury in its unguided discretion chose to
give it.""' The real issue in MacDonald & Watson was whether
" See id. at 51 (noting D'Allesandro had been advised that "illegal shipments of the
type alleged had previously occurred").
10 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
110 See MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 53.
"' United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 679 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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D'Allesandro had sufficient cause to investigate the possibility that
illegal disposal activity was taking place. Had he been aware of a
"high probability" of illegality and still failed to investigate, he
could have been convicted of having had actual knowledge of the
crime, based on a theory of willful blindness.
Proving knowledge via willful blindness rather than using the
RCO doctrine may indeed place a greater burden on the government
in order to obtain convictions under RCRA. One commentator
argues that the important public welfare purposes of RCRA and of
environmental statutes in general validate the use of the RCO doc-
trine.112 If Congress agreed with this viewpoint, it could simply
remove the knowledge requirement from the criminal penalties under
RCRA, thus bringing the Park analysis fully to bear on RCRA
prosecutions. The fact that Congress has not done so is a powerful
indication that it does not condone the easy migration of the RCO
doctrine to statutes that require "knowing" violations.
CONCLUSION
The split in the circuits regarding the application of the RCO
doctrine to RCRA, and to environmental statutes in general, is ripe
for Supreme Court review. Reasoning that environmental statutes
are doubtless public welfare statutes, some courts have attempted to
side-step the requirement of proving actual knowledge in order to
impose criminal penalties under RCRA. They have done so by
applying the RCO doctrine to establish proof of "constructive"
knowledge, based neither on direct, indirect, or circumstantial evi-
dence. Such attempts are bound to tempt juries to convict defendants
on the basis of strict liability, which is the type of criminal liability
that the RCO doctrine was designed to enforce. Strict liability,
however, is not the type of liability that Congress established under
§ 6928(d) of RCRA.
In construing public welfare statutes, courts are required to
balance two conflicting goals: guarding individual rights and pro-
tecting the public welfare. In the case of criminal acts that are solely
statutory creations, courts look to Congress for guidance in striking
the proper balance between these two goals. When Congress has
removed the mens rea requirement in certain limited situations,
courts have been willing to hold "responsible" corporate officers
112 See Milne, supra note 2, at 333-34 (describing the dangers of pollution and the need
for criminal convictions of corporate officers for environmental offenses).
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liable for criminal violations without any "consciousness of wrong-
doing" or any affirmative act at all. When Congress has explicitly
inserted a knowledge requirement into a statute, however, courts
must rely on the traditional doctrines relating to proof of knowledge,
including the doctrine of willful blindness. Although RCRA convic-
tions may be more difficult without the application of the RCO
doctrine, such is the apparent intent of Congress. Without explicit
instructions to the contrary, courts should not use the RCO doc-
trine as a means of ignoring this intent.
Ronald M. Broudy

